The social purpose of corporations by Hsieh, Nien-Hê et al.
This is a repository copy of The social purpose of corporations.
White Rose Research Online URL for this paper:
http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/146462/
Version: Published Version
Article:
Hsieh, Nien-Hê, Meyer, Marco orcid.org/0000-0002-1380-0205, Rodin, David et al. (1 
more author) (2018) The social purpose of corporations. Journal of the British Academy. 
pp. 49-73. 
https://doi.org/10.5871/jba/006s1.049
eprints@whiterose.ac.uk
https://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/
Reuse 
This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 
(CC BY-NC-ND) licence. This licence only allows you to download this work and share it with others as long 
as you credit the authors, but you can’t change the article in any way or use it commercially. More 
information and the full terms of the licence here: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/ 
Takedown 
If you consider content in White Rose Research Online to be in breach of UK law, please notify us by 
emailing eprints@whiterose.ac.uk including the URL of the record and the reason for the withdrawal request. 
The social purpose of corporations
NIEN-HÊ HSIEH, MARCO MEYER, 
DAVID RODIN and JENS VAN ‘T KLOOSTER
Abstract: To think about the purpose of corporations is to think about what 
 corporations are for. In this article, we argue that the concept of a purpose has an 
important role in thinking about the moral evaluation of corporations. We make three 
contributions. First, we distinguish different uses of the concepts of social and corpor-
ate purpose. Social purpose concerns the contribution that the corporation makes to 
realising societal goals. Corporate purpose concerns the goals the corporation should 
actively pursue. Second, we investigate whether corporations ought to serve a social 
purpose and whether corporations ought to actively pursue their corporate purpose. 
Third, we explore critically what roles the concepts of social and corporate purpose 
can fulfil in moral reflection on and of corporations. In particular, we distinguish the 
constructive, the communicative, and the critical role of social and corporate 
purpose. 
Keywords: Social purpose, corporate purpose, the corporation, market failures, 
 measurement of purpose.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
What are corporations for? This paper provides an analytical review of relevant 
research on this question, and some thoughts on the moral evaluation of corpor-
ations. It distinguishes between the concepts of social purpose and corporate purpose. 
Social purpose concerns the specific contribution that a corporation makes to realis-
ing societal goals. Corporate purpose concerns the goals the corporation should 
actively pursue.
Related questions of whether corporations ought to serve a social purpose, 
whether they ought actively to pursue their corporate purpose, and how to articulate, 
pursue, and measure corporate purpose are explored. Determining social purpose 
quickly raises difficult political questions. The arguments for a minimalist or a 
 maximalist approach to social purpose are set out and debated. 
Journal of the British Academy, 6(s1), 49–73. DOI https://doi.org/10.5871/jba/006s1.049
Posted  17 December 2018; Pre-print posted 13 November 2018. © The British Academy 2018
50 Hsieh, Meyer, Rodin and Van ‘t Klooster 
The authors conducted interviews with 24 business leaders which highlighted 
 frustration at the vague concept of social purpose and exactly how social and corpor-
ate purpose relate to each other. There was broad agreement that corporations should 
serve some social purpose, but not precisely what this might be. 
The authors outline three reasons why societies become entitled to make claims on 
corporations, based on the principle of reciprocity. Corporations rely on society’s 
legal system for adjudication and protection. They rely on access to scarce resources 
that might otherwise be deployed elsewhere, and they are a constant source of social 
and economic disruption as they undertake their business.
Efficiency and market competition are often cited as forces that might steer firms 
to social purpose, but the paper argues that pervasive market failures suggest that 
social purpose cannot be left entirely to the corporation. A web of other factors might 
also obstruct that goal.
Likewise, corporate purpose cannot be determined by the corporation alone due 
to a lack of ‘epistemic competence’ or the ability to balance and judge competing 
stakeholder interests, and the fact that corporations interact within political and social 
structures. The paper considers the societal responsiveness and shared value 
approaches to articulating corporate purpose, and the shortcomings of these 
methodologies.
One of the most complex challenges is the meaningful measurement of corporate 
and social purpose. Most current measures of corporate purpose are accounting 
 measures. Social purpose also uses holistic action-guiding measures for environmental, 
social, and governance impacts. However, none is yet satisfactory, and measurement 
remains ‘the most important condition for giving bite to corporate purpose’.
1 INTRODUCTION
To think about the purpose of corporations is to think about what corporations are 
for. In the academic literature, terms such as ‘social purpose’ and ‘corporate purpose’ 
are seldom used, and if  they are, they are used with little precision. However, business 
leaders increasingly use these terms, as we learned from the 24 interviews that we con-
ducted as background to our research. While the interviewees were not selected to be 
representative, their overwhelming emphasis that social purpose is important provides 
an interesting contrast to the dearth of explicit theorising on social purpose in the 
academic literature. Indeed, business leaders expressed unease that the concept of 
social purpose remains vague and pointed to the need for a clear framework to articu-
late and measure social purpose. In this paper, we contribute to meeting this need by 
providing an analytical review of the topic of purpose and arguing that it is a useful 
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concept for thinking about what corporations ought to do. 
The first contribution of this article is to distinguish the different ways in which 
the notions of social and corporate purpose are understood, and to differentiate them 
from related concepts (Section 2). We distinguish social purpose from corporate 
 purpose. Social purpose concerns the contribution that a corporation makes to 
advancing societal goals. It is possible to make such a contribution without actively 
pursuing it. Corporate purpose concerns the goals the corporation should actively 
pursue. We suggest that much of the disagreement pertaining to the topic of the pur-
pose of corporations revolves around different theories of how social purpose and 
corporate purpose relate to each other. 
Our second contribution is to clarify the debate about whether corporations ought 
to have a social purpose and whether corporations ought to have a corporate purpose 
(Section 3). There is broad agreement that corporations ought to serve some social 
purpose, even if  there are competing views on what the social purpose of corporations 
consists in. A major point of contention is whether corporations should directly pur-
sue this social purpose or focus on financial goals instead. We argue that views that 
seek to entirely dissociate corporate purpose from social purpose rely on strong 
assumptions about competitive markets which are increasingly unrealistic. But, we 
also argue that, even if  corporations should ensure social purpose, this responsibility 
cannot be left entirely to the corporation itself. This tension between societal and firm 
responsibility is at the core of our understanding of social purpose.
The third contribution of the article is to explore how to deal with this tension by 
asking what role the concept of social purpose can play in practice (Section 4). We 
distinguish a constructive, a communicative, and a critical role of social purpose, and 
discuss the ways in which the concept of social purpose can serve these functions.
2 CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATIONS
In our interviews with business leaders, we encountered a broad spectrum of views on 
social and corporate purpose. Some see an organisation’s purpose as a source of motiv-
ation for themselves and employees. Others regard purpose as a precondition of their 
right to operate in a country or as the expression of the particular vision of the founder 
of the corporation. A number of interviewees think of purpose as the most  fundamental 
anchor of their corporate strategy, or as a competitive advantage. Yet others expressed 
worries that thinking too much about purpose may distract management from 
 pursuing the economic goals of the corporation. There was broad agreement about 
the need for a conceptual framework navigating these different perspectives on social 
purpose. We begin the formulation of such a framework by looking more closely at 
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the concept of a purpose and distinguishing two different meanings which we refer to 
as ‘social purpose’ and ‘corporate purpose’. Social purpose concerns the contribution 
that a corporation makes to advancing societal goals, regardless of whether it directly 
pursues these goals or advances them as a side effect. By contrast, we use the term 
‘corporate purpose’ to refer to any non-financial social goals that the corporation 
directly pursues.
2.1 What is purpose?
What is the nature of a purpose? Philosophers have held different views on the nature 
of purpose throughout history. Aristotle and his medieval followers thought of pur-
pose as one of the four defining causes of a natural kind. Thus, for Aristotle, to be a 
drink literally is to be something that serves the purpose of quenching thirst. On this 
perspective, identifying a purpose is a matter of discovering something about the 
nature of things.
This realist view of purpose was called into question by early modern  philosophers 
such as Hobbes and Spinoza. They maintained that the purpose of a thing exists only 
relative to the interests of an agent. A taxi has no purpose if  there has never been 
anyone who desired to be moved around. To find out about a purpose of something 
we need to know more about the people who desire to use it. What are their prefer-
ences and interests? It is these agential properties that determine the purpose of things. 
This view emphasises the constructive role of the subject in assigning a purpose to 
things. To identify a purpose is to discover something about the ways things are 
 perceived to be useful. 
The latter perspective provides a better guide to investigating the social purpose of 
corporations because it can readily make sense of disagreements over what the pur-
pose of a corporation is. People will value what a corporation does or might do for 
different reasons. Is the purpose of a supermarket to provide a wide variety of 
high-quality products to customers? Or should a supermarket focus on locally sourced 
products to achieve its environmental purpose? Is part of the purpose of a supermar-
ket to provide meaningful work to employees? The realist perspective suggests that 
there is one correct answer to these questions and in this sense does not recognise the 
fact of reasonable disagreement (Rawls, 1996). For our interests here it is important 
that purpose is a topic on which people indeed disagree and therefore use a  constructivist 
vocabulary to talk about purposes.
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2.2 What is a social purpose?
Societies can be seen as complex social systems. Different parts of social systems, such 
as politics, science, or education, can be differentiated along functional lines (Habermas 
1985, Luhmann 1977). Subsystems operate according to specific rules in order to serve 
particular purposes. The question of the social purpose of corporations concerns the 
role that corporations ought to serve within a social system. The social purpose of a 
corporation is the specific contribution it makes to advancing societal goals. 
Our focus in the following will be on the topic of social purpose as it applies to 
corporations. The ‘corporation’ is a type of legal entity that provides a framework for 
individuals to organise joint activities. In business corporations, these activities are 
aimed towards the production of goods and services. Often corporations are defined 
even more narrowly as organisations whose (private) purpose is to make profits for 
owners and shareholders (Blair 2003, Ciepley 2013, Stout 2012). But this narrow 
 definition neglects that corporations take a wide variety of legal forms, including not 
just the publicly listed limited liability company (Blair 2003), but also state-owned 
enterprises (Detomasi 2015, Scherer et al. 2016), social enterprises (Santos 2012), 
 benefit companies (Vaughan & Arsneault 2018), and cooperatives (Cheney et al. 
2014). Regardless of their specific legal form, all corporations are legal persons in 
their own right (Hansmann et al. 2006). Corporations have a right to own property, to 
enter into contracts, and to sue others in court. The corporation shares these traits 
with a wide range of public and private organisations. The feature that we take to set 
business corporations apart from those organisations is their role in  production and 
exchange of goods and services. 
On the most abstract level, regardless of whether organisations produce soft 
drinks, spin social networks, or organise taxi rides, the purpose of corporations is to 
facilitate valuable activities, such as the production of valuable goods and services in 
the case of businesses. But corporations do not only produce value for customers. For 
instance, corporations also provide employment, which provides people with an 
income but can also support personal development and a sense of meaning. 
Corporations can also serve as investment vehicles for their owners or shareholders. 
All these things together inform the social purpose of corporations. A corporation 
has a social purpose in the sense that we are interested in if  it contributes to advancing 
societal goals. 
In the rest of the article we explore the concept of social purpose and show that it 
can do important work in moral reflection on corporations. Consider now four aspects 
of how we understand the topic of social purpose. 
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First, the concept of social purpose is compatible with different ways of demarcating 
the ‘society’ that the corporation is useful for. Although national borders retain some 
role in demarcating social structures, corporations often have a purpose for social 
structures that do not track these borders. Large MNCs (multinational corporations) 
can be seen as a part of a global society, whereas smaller firms have a social role that 
is tied to much more local structures.
Second, although reflection on social purpose often leads to consideration of  a 
wide range of  stakeholders, the concept is entirely independent of  the stakeholder 
framework. Stakeholder demands and interests can be thought of  as one way to 
 analyse the different functions that a corporation plays for society. Stakeholders are 
the different groups of  individuals who have an interest in the activities of  the 
corpor ation. Traditionally, stakeholders are shareholders and other beneficiary 
owners, management, employees, customers, and other affected individuals. 
Analysing the potential impact of  a corporation on different stakeholders is often 
an insightful way of  categorising the different purposes of  corporations. But, there 
are many ways in which to group the individuals for whom a corporation has a pur-
pose. Nothing about the topic of  social purposes implies the need for the vocabulary 
of  stakeholders. Moreover, as we will discuss in more detail in Section 3, the corpor-
ation can make contributions to social purpose without actively pursuing these. For 
a corporation to have a social purpose it need not actively manage the interest of 
stakeholders. 
Third, the social purpose of  a corporation is something that people disagree on. 
Is Facebook’s purpose to connect people, or does it also include a commitment to 
protect the privacy of  users? Identifying the social purpose of  a corporation requires 
recognising the fact that different private purposes may conflict. For instance, the 
goals of  providing a wide selection of  vegetables and of  sourcing locally may 
 conflict. Importantly, as we bring out in Section 3, the corporation itself  is often not 
the most suitable place in which to solve these big societal questions concerning 
ultimate  societal goals. 
Finally, not all corporate activities that have a private purpose thereby also have 
a clear social purpose. For example, there is a considerable segment of  complex 
financial products that is bought by less sophisticated customers and has lower return 
than simpler financial products (Célérier & Vallee 2015, 2013, Zingales 2015). The 
main purpose of  their complexity seems to be duping consumers into buying 
low-quality financial assets. More generally, a corporation can do better or worse in 
fulfilling the societal expectations that determine its purpose. A social purpose 
explains how a  corporation’s operations contribute to the different ends that society 
and its members pursue.
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2.3 What is corporate purpose?
It is crucial to distinguish social purpose from what we will refer to as ‘corporate 
 purpose’. Corporate purpose consists in the overarching management objectives of a 
corporation that go beyond narrow financial metrics, such as providing good work, 
contributing to sustainable economic development, or fostering consumer autonomy. 
Hence a corporation that is exclusively managed to maximise profits does not have a 
corporate purpose in our usage of the term. The key difference between social pur-
pose and corporate purpose is that corporate purpose concerns the intentions and 
ambitions of corporations, whereas social purpose is an analytical concept to describe 
the actual societal contributions corporations make. 
Pursuing a corporate purpose is compatible with pursuing profits. However, the 
concept of corporate purpose should be distinguished from that of shared value. 
Shared value approaches suggest that corporations should pursue opportunities that 
generate profits while also producing value for society (Dembek et al. 2016, Porter & 
Kramer 2011). Here, the pursuit of narrow financial  objectives goes together with the 
pursuit of purpose. Most corporation will be able to pursue at least some financial 
aims by also aiming for broader societal goals. But the pursuit of corporate purpose 
is not always also the most profitable strategy and there is often a serious question of 
how to prioritise different ends. If  maximising financial benefits conflicts with societal 
goals, a corporation with a strong corporate purpose will give considerable weight to 
societal goals.
The questions of whether a corporation should have a social purpose and whether 
it should have a corporate purpose are distinct. On some views, corporations ought to 
serve a social purpose, but serving their social purpose does not require them to have 
a corporate purpose. Proponents of this view may maintain that pursuing financial 
objectives (rather than corporate purpose) steers corporations towards their true 
social purpose of making efficient use of societal resources. 
It is also possible to deny that corporations ought to serve a social purpose, yet to 
maintain that corporations ought to have a corporate purpose. For instance, someone 
unconvinced by the social purpose of corporations may still maintain that some cor-
porations should voluntarily adopt a particular corporate purpose to meet customer 
preferences for ‘ethical products’.
A lot of disagreement arises because social purpose and corporate purpose are not 
clearly distinguished. Even if  there is wide disagreement over what is actually socially 
purposeful, there is far less disagreement over whether corporations ought to serve a 
social purpose. This is assumed to be the case even by economists who maintain that 
corporations in aggregate will achieve their social purpose by individually pursuing 
profit in a competitive market environment. We will return to the merits of such views 
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below. For now, what matters is the conceptual distinction between social purpose and 
corporate purpose. Once we agree on the social purpose of corporations, there is the 
further question of corporate purpose.
3 NORMATIVE FOUNDATIONS
Our interviewees overwhelmingly endorsed the importance of purpose. They 
 recognised the fundamental notion of social purpose as a meaningful category for the 
evaluation of corporate activities. They also acknowledged the importance of cor-
porate purpose. While some saw corporate purpose as external to the core business of 
the corporation, to be discharged via volunteering or charitable giving, most agreed 
that the pursuit of non-financial goals has to underpin the core activities of the 
corporation. 
We will now outline a normative foundation that justifies these moral judgements. 
We first investigate why we should assume that a corporation should serve a social 
purpose. We then turn to the topic of corporate purpose, where we show that the 
moral issues are much less straightforward. Against those who hold that corporations 
should aim narrowly for profits, we argue that mere market competition cannot be 
assumed to realise social purpose. Through a critical discussion of Joseph Heath’s 
market failures approach we show that, because capitalism is a system of constant 
growth, the operations of firms continuously raise complex moral issues that cannot 
be reduced to the efficient allocation of resources. But, we also show that the role of a 
corporation in dealing with these moral issues must be limited, as the corporation is 
not the appropriate site for the required deliberation. Thus, although corporate pur-
pose has an important role in ensuring that the operations of an activity are useful 
from a societal perspective, the responsibility for social purpose cannot be left to the 
corporation alone. 
3.1 Ought corporations to serve a social purpose?
Let us first turn to the question of whether corporations ought to serve a social 
 purpose. If  it turns out that this is not the case, as some libertarians would argue, then 
it is questionable what value the concept has. We therefore explore the nature of the 
libertarian challenge and outline two ways of responding.
The libertarian position does not deny that corporations may and often do in fact 
generate substantial social benefits. What the libertarian rejects is that corporations 
are under any moral obligation to serve a social purpose. Instead, libertarians see 
corporations as legal entities allowing individuals to enter into various forms of 
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 voluntary association (Hasnas 1998, Marcoux 2003, Sollars 2002). Just as individuals 
are not obliged to serve a social purpose, corporations should not be held to such a 
stand ard either. The reason is that restricting corporate activities to those deemed 
socially purposeful would restrict the range of possible associations individuals can 
enter in the form of a corporation. Restricting corporations to socially purposeful 
activity means restricting the freedom of individuals as well.
There are two important arguments why corporations should serve a social 
 purpose. The first argument challenges the libertarian idea that corporations are mere 
vehicles for individuals to form voluntary associations. The rebuttal emphasises the 
legal autonomy that a firm has in relation to any natural person (Ciepley 2013, Orts 
2015, Stout 2012). The legal autonomy of corporations sets them apart from any one 
plan of action pursued by an individual. For a wide range of questions, a corporation 
is an agent deciding freely over the use of its productive assets and exercising author-
ity over its employees. For example, the role of shareholders in publicly traded 
 companies does not fit well with the libertarian idea of an autonomous exercise of the 
will (Stout 2012). Both the control shareholders have over the firm and the responsi-
bilities they bear are limited. For instance, shareholders cannot withdraw funds from 
the firm. At best, they can sell their shares to someone else. The legal form of the 
corporation also separates the financial positions of the corporation and its share-
holders. Bankruptcy of the corporation does not carry over to the shareholder. 
Conversely, bankruptcy of the shareholder does not impose costs on the firm. There 
is considerable debate on how to conceptualise the relation between personal and 
collective responsibility, but most authors now agree that a least some responsibilities 
are held at the collective level (Hess 2017; for an overview of recent debate, see Orts 
& Smith 2017). Given the considerable autonomy of the corporation as an agent, it 
cannot be treated as a mere private association that allows its members to exercise 
their freedom.
The first argument denies the view that corporations are to be understood in close 
analogy to human beings. Proponents of this argument can grant that individuals do 
not have to serve a social purpose. Proponents can also grant that the autonomy of 
individuals is of value because it is an important precondition for human freedom. 
Their use of societal resources and recourse to the legal system is justified because it 
enables them to live a free life. In Kantian terms, this insight is formulated in terms of 
the idea that human beings are ends in themselves (Altman 2007). But proponents deny 
that this argument carries over to corporations. Corporations have little or no intrinsic 
value. Instead, what corporations do is to coordinate the actions of several—and 
 sometimes very many—people to achieve certain goals. Corporations are not ends in 
themselves. This makes the moral status of the corporation distinct from the individuals 
whose actions it coordinates and the stakeholders whose interests are affected. 
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Note that the first argument merely opens up the possibility of imposing obligations 
on corporations to serve their social purpose by rebutting the libertarian argument. 
The first argument does not provide a positive argument as to why corporations 
should serve a social purpose.
The second argument makes a positive case for requiring corporations to serve a 
social purpose. The argument is based on the idea of reciprocity (Becker 1998, Gibbard 
1991, Rawls 1996). Corporations rely on social resources and infrastructure for their 
existence and continued operation. Their existence is only possible through a societal 
licence and continued support. In return, the operations of the corporation should 
have sufficient value for the society in which they operate (Bishop 2008, Brock 1998, 
Donaldson 1982, Hsieh 2015). 
Consider three distinct ways in which societies become entitled to make claims on 
corporations based on reciprocity. First, the corporation can only effectively operate 
because it has recourse to the legal system. The legal system provides adjudication 
where the corporation’s legal claims conflict with those of others. Moreover, citizens, 
as a rule, respect legal claims, and where they do not the state enforces the corpor-
ation’s legal claims. Individuals are entitled to participate in the legal system because 
it secures their fundamental rights but, as we discussed just now, there are no similarly 
pressing reasons why corporations should have rights.
Second, corporations rely on access to scarce resources. For instance, corporations 
require well-trained employees, capital, technology, and natural resources. If  these 
resources are used by a corporation, they cannot be used in other ways. 
Third, corporations are a constant source of social and economic disruption. 
When corporations innovate, societies need to use their scarce political resources to 
deal with the consequences and make adaptations where necessary. 
Because operations of corporations are enabled by social resources and infrastructure, 
corporations should serve a social purpose as a matter of reciprocity. 
We have presented two arguments why corporations ought to serve a social 
 purpose. The first argument debunks the libertarian case against social purpose. The 
second argument provides a positive reason why corporations should serve a social 
purpose. We do not purport to settle the substantive argument between libertarians 
and proponents of social purpose here. However, we note that the lines of argument 
that we put forward are widely shared and also fit with the views that our interviewees 
put forward. This further illustrates the usefulness of the concept.
3.2 Ought corporations to have a corporate purpose? 
Let us now consider whether corporations ought to have a corporate purpose, and what 
that purpose consists in. Recall that corporate purpose is any overall  management 
objective to be pursued alongside financial metrics and that aims at a social objective.
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In the following, we focus on corporate purpose that goes beyond the corporation’s 
role in charitable activities in the community, and other forms of corporate social 
responsibility and corporate citizenship that are tangential to the core of the business 
model (Néron & Norman 2008).
As we have shown, it does not follow from the commitment to social purpose 
that corporations ought to have a corporate purpose. Minimalist positions maintain that 
corporations ought not to pursue non-financial objectives because social purpose is 
best served if  corporations focus on the pursuit of financial goals (Friedman 1970, 
Heath 2014, 2004, Jensen 2005, Sundaram & Inkpen 2004). In a slogan, the view is 
that the only responsibility of the corporation is to make a profit. Not even Milton 
Friedman, to whom the view is often attributed, endorsed this position without 
 qualification (Bruin 2015). Rather, he stated that the corporation should ‘use its 
resources and engage in activities designed to increase its profits so long as it stays 
within the rules of the game, which is to say, engages in open and free competition, 
without deception or fraud’ (Friedman 1970).
To explain why we find minimalist conceptions of corporate purpose deficient, we 
focus on Joseph Heath’s ‘Market Failure Approach’, which stands out because it starts 
off  with a conception of social purpose (Heath 2004, 2014). Invoking an account of 
the corporation as realising an efficient allocation of resources, Heath also provides a 
sustained argument why corporations should not attempt to promote social purpose 
directly. Our critique of Heath allows us to show that (i) the social purpose of the 
corporation cannot be reduced to that of realising an efficient allocation of resources 
and, therefore, (ii) that the mere striving for profits is not the best way to realise the 
corporation’s purpose.
Market actors such as corporations, Heath argues, are not accountable to the 
moral demands that the economic system as a whole must satisfy. Corporations are 
given licence to maximise profits because, in reasonably competitive markets, this is 
thought to be the best way to promote social purpose. Hence, corporations fulfil their 
social purpose by maximising profits. To evaluate the argument against corporate 
 purpose, we need to understand why competitive markets might steer profit-maximising 
firms to serve their social purpose best. 
The first assumption in Heath’s argument is that the social purpose of 
 corporations is to realise an efficient allocation of  resources. Economic efficiency is 
defined in terms of  Pareto optimality. A distribution is Pareto optimal if  there is no 
alternative distribution that makes at least one person better off  without making at 
least one person worse off. Why would economic efficiency be socially beneficial? 
There is a quick argument why, other things being equal, economically efficient 
 distributions are to be preferred to inefficient ones. All this argument assumes is the 
moral principle of   minimal benevolence. According to minimal benevolence, for any 
individual, it is morally better if  this individual is better off, other things being 
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equal (Hausman et al. 2016). It follows that a distribution that is Pareto superior to 
another distribution is morally better. The reason is that, by definition, the Pareto-
superior distribution leaves  everybody at least as well off  and makes at least one 
person better off.
But economic efficiency may come into conflict with other criteria of  economic 
 success. Economic efficiency is a feature of  economies at a given point in time. In 
testing for efficiency, we are considering a snapshot of  the economy, and asking 
whether there are ways of  improving the given situation without making anyone 
worse off. Efficiency, then, needs to be distinguished from dynamic progress. A 
dynamically progressive  economy is one that grows, increasing the volume of  assets 
available for distribution.
There is no conceptual link between economic efficiency and dynamic progress. 
Hence, an economy may be inefficient yet dynamically progressive, as well as  efficient 
yet lacking in dynamical progress. It is not obvious at all from an economic stand-
point why we should be more impressed with efficiency than with dynamic 
 progressiveness. The main reason that welfare levels in capitalist societies have so 
dramatically increased compared to two hundred years ago is that these economies 
have continuously grown. This reflects the great dynamic progressiveness of   capitalist 
societies, rather than their efficiency. For designing and regulating markets, it is of 
critical importance to identify the social purposes that corporations ought to serve 
in a way that is sufficiently inclusive. New products do not always meet existing 
 customer demand, but sometimes shape customer preferences. The aim of  pursuing 
efficiency is of  little use to engineers at Tesla or Amazon, who ponder how to 
design self-driving cars or delivery drones. Nor will it be of  much help to regulators 
who worry about licensing these new  products. But questions of  social purpose are 
not only relevant for cutting-edge tech companies. Virtually all companies ask 
 questions which cannot be answered in terms of  Pareto efficiency, such as what 
quality of  products and services to offer, which sales practices to adopt, how to treat 
staff, which customer groups to target, where to  produce, and many others. 
Answering these questions requires reflection on values such as autonomy, freedom, 
access to livelihood, and good work, as values that  corporations can help realise 
(Hsieh 2017).
If  we recognise other goals than economic efficiency, Heath’s argument against 
corporate purpose breaks down. It is hardly plausible, for instance, that a 
 corporation aiming at narrow financial indicators will thereby promote autonomy 
or good work. 
We also want to challenge Heath’s second assumption, which is that markets are 
special-purpose institutions to steer profit-maximising corporations towards  economic 
efficiency. Here, Heath puts forward a view that is widely shared by minimalists. 
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Heath recognises that most economic distributions that are efficient are not thereby 
just or otherwise desirable from a social perspective. But Heath maintains that in 
 competitive markets, it is the role of the welfare state, particularly the tax system, to 
promote an equitable distribution among the many possible efficient distributions. 
The second welfare theorem underpins Heath’s thesis that efficiency and equity can 
be functionally separated. The second welfare theorem implies that, whatever  efficient 
outcome you want to achieve, non-distortive taxes and transfers push the economy to 
settle on this distribution. The theorem suggests a division of labour between corpor-
ations and the state. Corporations pursue profits to achieve efficiency, and the state 
ensures that economic benefits are distributed equitably. Hence corporations ought not 
to pursue corporate purpose in perfectly competitive markets.
Heath’s argument requiring corporations to focus only on the pursuit of profits 
holds only in perfectly competitive markets. Markets are perfectly competitive if  both 
buyers and sellers are sufficiently numerous and well informed that no market par-
ticipant can control the price at which goods are sold. In perfectly competitive  markets 
transaction costs are zero, products are undifferentiated, and there are no barriers to 
entry and exit. There are also no information asymmetries in perfectly competitive 
markets, and all costs and benefits generated by a transaction fall only on the 
 contracting parties. 
Many actual markets are clearly far from perfectly competitive. For instance, 
information asymmetries between banks and their customers enable banks to charge 
higher prices than they could in perfectly competitive markets. Big tech companies 
like Facebook and Google enjoy enormous market power because the network char-
acter of their products creates high barriers to entry. Airlines and their customers do 
not internalise all costs of flying but shift some of the environmental damage onto all 
of society, including future generations. To appreciate how radically existing markets 
deviate from perfectly competitive markets, consider that profits in perfectly competi-
tive markets are zero in the long run. The reason is that, if  a market generates profits, 
more firms will enter the market and bid the price down until profits are zero. Yet 
there are very few industries which run anywhere close to zero profits. Heath main-
tains that in non-competitive markets, the corporation should behave as it would in a 
perfectly competitive market. For instance, it should not take advantage of informa-
tion asymmetry or monopoly power. Hence he acknowledges a limited role for 
 corporate purpose. Corporate purpose consists in pursuing Pareto-optimal outcomes 
even if  that does not maximise profits because markets are not fully competitive. 
Corporations, according to Heath, ought to correct market failures. 
We think that perfectly competitive markets are often not the appropriate  paradigm 
for reflecting on social purpose of corporations. In imperfect markets, the best way to 
improve social outcomes may often not be to approximate perfect competition. It 
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follows from the ‘theory of the second best’ that removing some but not all market 
failures often leads to less rather than more efficient outcomes (Lipsey & Lancaster 
1956). Eric Harsch, CEO of the German drugstore DM, explained to us in an  interview 
that he takes the welfare and development of his employees to be more important 
than either profits or low prices for customers. In a perfectly competitive market, pur-
suing any other goals than profit maximisation should price corporations out of the 
market in the long run. Since the German retail market is not a perfectly competitive 
market, DM can pursue another candidate component of corporate  purpose, namely 
good work. This example illustrates that exploiting some market  imperfections may 
enable corporations to serve their social purpose better.
In sum, the minimalist view that sees the role of the corporation as limited to the 
pursuit of profits while not exploiting market failures is too narrow. This allows it to 
deny that a corporation should develop its own conception of its purpose in a way 
that goes beyond narrow financial metrics. We have raised two objections to Joseph 
Heath’s moderate form of minimalism. First, he equates the social purpose of the 
corporation with that of realising an efficient allocation of resources, but, as we argue, 
there is in fact a much wider range of purposes that corporations pursue. Second, 
irrespective of what the social purpose of a given corporation turns out to be, it can-
not be assumed that removing market imperfection is the best way to ensure that the 
corporation serves that purpose. 
We now turn to maximalist conceptions of corporate purpose, which maintain 
that the corporation realises its social purpose best by actively pursuing it. Stakeholder 
theorists endorse this position insofar as they maintain that corporations should be 
managed to realise a fair treatment of the interests of all those affected by their oper-
ations. The firm is to ‘focus on how value gets created for each and every stakeholder’ 
(Freeman et al. 2010: 9). There are now several competing forms of Stakeholder 
Theory, including corporate citizenship (Logsdon & Wood 2002, Néron & Norman 
2008, Scherer & Palazzo 2007) and views drawing on particular moral traditions, such 
as Kantian ethics (Arnold & Harris 2012), virtue ethics (Koehn 1995, Solomon 1993), 
social contract theory (Dunfee 2006), or Confucianism (Kim & Strudler 2012). What 
these maximalist approaches share is the view that social purpose is something that 
corporations themselves ought to pursue.
The debate between minimalist and maximalist positions concerns whether the best 
way of achieving social purpose is to pursue this purpose directly. Minimalists main-
tain that regulators ought to set incentives to steer corporations towards their social 
purpose, on the condition that they pursue profits. Both sides agree that corporations 
should serve a social purpose, but have very different views on corporate purpose. 
This maximalist view is closely related to a view, which we often encountered in 
our interviews, which holds that corporate purpose is something that the corporation 
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itself  determines. This assumption also informs a part of the business ethics literature, 
where the locus of deliberation is often implicitly assumed to be the firm itself. But 
when it comes to the big questions of corporate and social purpose, this may not be 
the most promising approach. Consider three arguments that count against leaving 
decisions on purpose entirely to corporations. 
First, there are good reasons to doubt whether firms are able to adjudicate 
 competing interests in a fair way. For one thing, there is an issue of incentives and 
motivation. The coordination of the economy through markets fosters competition in 
a way that often goes against a measured weighing of interests. There is also an issue 
of epistemic competence. Firms will lack the information to know how to adjudicate 
the interests of its shareholders, employees, and customers. 
Second, identifying a corporate purpose is a large burden, which should not be 
placed on corporations alone. Individual corporations are part of a functionally dif-
ferentiated subsystem of society (Habermas 1985, Luhmann 1977). This subsystem is 
embedded in political and social institutions that seek to regulate the private sphere 
and protect those interests that are not adequately protected by it (Granovetter 1985, 
Polanyi 2001). The social responsibility of firms cannot be determined without 
 considering the basic structure of social and political institutions that they are part of 
(Heath et al. 2010, Hsieh 2017, Rawls 1999).
Finally, setting a corporate purpose sometimes has political repercussions that a 
corporation’s management lacks the legitimacy to make. As recent shareholder 
 theorists are right to point out, ‘What is the social, economic, and political legitimacy 
of a manager to choose? Who oversees and legitimates these choices?’ (See also Hsieh 
2017, Sundaram & Inkpen 2004.)
Leaving it to corporations alone to determine their corporate purpose involves a 
fallacy of composition. Each corporation pursuing a corporate purpose may not lead 
to corporations as a whole creating social value. Instead, the best way to secure the 
social purpose of the corporation involves different responsibilities for individual 
 corporations, regulators, and other societal institutions. We now turn to the question 
of what role the concepts of corporate and social purpose can serve in deliberation on 
these questions. 
4 MANAGING FOR PURPOSE
In this section, we distinguish three functions that deliberation on purpose can serve: 
the constructive function of guiding corporate strategy and regulation, the communi-
cative role of managing the relationship of corporations with society, and the critical 
role of evaluating the performance of corporations beyond financial indicators. 
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Purpose serves a constructive function if  regulators design markets and regulation to 
steer corporations towards their social purpose, and if  corporations articulate their 
corporate purpose to support their social purpose, embedding their corporate pur-
pose into different aspects of their operations, including their product development, 
business model, and organisational culture. The communicative function is for 
 corporations to negotiate with governments, regulators, and civil society about what 
contribution the corporation should make to society. The critical function allows 
 corporations to monitor their contribution to society and allows society to criticise cor-
porations that fail to achieve their purpose or engage in activities that manifestly 
undermine their purpose.
We should be aware that corporations may invoke purpose rhetoric to dress up 
their operations. If  so, social purpose risks becoming a mere marketing buzzword 
(Dembek et al. 2016). It will then obscure the moral landscape by dignifying corpor-
ations with a purported purpose they fail to live up to. Or, at the very least, distract 
the corporation’s attention from its economic objectives.
In this section, we lay out what it would take for society and corporations to take 
purpose seriously. We do this through a critical review of existing tools available in the 
business ethics literature and making suggestions on how this literature can be 
extended to accommodate reflection on purpose. 
4.1 The constructive function of social and corporate purpose
For regulators and other societal actors, the constructive function consists in steering 
corporations towards meeting their social purpose. For corporations, the constructive 
function consists in articulating a corporate purpose that is consistent with the cor-
poration’s social purpose and to consistently embed their corporate purpose in the 
organisation’s operations, strategy, and organisational culture. All of these functions 
are currently insufficiently theorised. A fully developed social purpose approach will 
be able to guide corporations and societal actors to work out the proper role of 
 corporations in society. 
Let us first turn to the constructive role of social purpose from the perspective of 
societal actors. Corporations develop their corporate purpose within a regulatory 
framework. The role of regulators and other political actors is to design markets and 
regulation to steer corporations towards socially desirable outcomes. 
Articulating the social purpose of corporations involves a complex interactive 
process. One crucial question is what role corporations themselves should have in this 
process. The classical liberal view is that the corporation should stay out of the political 
process (Friedman 1970, Jensen 2005). Others suggest that corporations can take a role 
in the political process on an equal footing with citizens (Néron & Norman 2008), or 
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that corporations can act to support the political process (Christiano 2010, Néron 
2016). Finally, there are those who see corporations themselves as sites of  political 
deliberation, in isolation from and sometimes in opposition to the government 
(Crane et al. 2008, Scherer & Palazzo 2011, Scherer et al. 2016). We need an account 
of  the political role of  corporations in democratic societies, realistically 
understood.
Let us now turn to the constructive role of corporate purpose within corporations. 
There is little academic literature on the steps that organisations take in articulating 
their purpose. The prevailing frameworks that a fully articulated framework can draw 
on are stakeholder management (Mitchell et al. 1997), social responsiveness (Wood 
1991), and the shared value approach (Porter & Kramer 2011).
Stakeholder management suggests proceeding in three steps: first, identifying 
the relevant stakeholders of  a corporation; second, determining the interests of 
stakeholders; third, articulating the benefits the corporation brings to each stake-
holder group. The social responsiveness approach asks corporations to identify 
societal issues on which their operations have a bearing. Societal issues that are 
often discussed are gender equality, ecology, and inequality. In a second step, corpor-
ations are asked to articulate the ways in which they seek to address these  challenges. 
The shared value approach proposes to identify areas where a given corporation can 
profitably create social values. This requires identifying, first, the areas in which the 
corporation has the expertise and resources to operate profitably. Second, the 
 corporation selects the profitable areas where it can simultaneously create value 
for society. 
All three methodologies may play some part in articulating a corporation’s social 
purpose. But all approaches share two fundamental shortcomings. First, they do not 
fully confront the question of what the corporation is. The stakeholder approach 
replaces the question of corporate purpose with the question of how the corporation 
benefits its stakeholders. The social responsiveness approach focuses on the question 
of how the corporation can influence major societal issues. The shared value approach 
seeks to determine where the economic interests of the corporation and the interests 
of society overlap. 
The second shortcoming is that methodologies address the management of 
 corporations as arbiters of corporate purpose. In the previous section, we have dis-
cussed to what extent the corporate purpose of a given organisation can be ‘read off’ 
the social purpose of corporations in general. We identified reasons to doubt that 
corporate purpose can simply be deduced from the social purpose of corporations, 
and that corporations can determine their purpose at will. But existing methodologies 
fail to address how regulators and societal stakeholders get an appropriate say in 
articulating corporate purpose.
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Developing a methodology to articulate corporate purpose can fruitfully proceed 
by integrating the existing approaches in the literature with the developing practice in 
corporations. Currently, conceptual and methodological questions in articulating 
their purpose are resolved unwittingly or with little consideration of possible alterna-
tives. For instance, should corporations be guided by the legacy of the business, or by 
its current or potential future capabilities? Do corporations have one overarching 
 corporate purpose, or do they serve different purposes? If  the latter, should purposes 
be differentiated by lines of business or by products? Is corporate purpose to be 
 identified inductively by analysing the benefits of diverse corporate activities? Or 
should a conception of purpose be formulated top-down and shape operations to 
conform to that purpose? Which internal and external stakeholders should be involved 
in articulating corporate purpose? A methodology for articulating corporate purpose 
within the constraints of social purpose would help resolve these outstanding issues. 
4.3 The communicative role of social and corporate purpose
The communicative role of social and corporate purpose is to enable a differentiated 
normative debate about the proper goals of corporations and the social harms and 
benefits they are generating. Articulations of social and corporate purpose can serve 
as the starting point to find common ground between different accounts of the proper 
role of particular corporations in society, and to debate whether the corporate  purpose 
of a corporation is consistent with its social purpose.
How much say should regulators and politicians on the one hand, and corporations 
on the other hand have in settling questions about the proper purpose of corpor-
ations? This question is intimately connected to the deep moral question concerning 
the political legitimacy of the corporation. On the classical liberal perspective, issues 
of corporate purpose are to be left to corporations (Friedman 1970, Jensen 2005). 
Corporate activity belongs on the private side of the private/public distinction and 
should, therefore, be protected from government interference.
However, business ethicists have recently started to challenge this classical liberal 
perspective (Ciepley 2013, Heath et al. 2010, McMahon 2012, Néron 2010). In their 
view, corporate activity belongs at least partly on the public side of the private/public 
distinction and hence needs to live up to standards of political legitimacy. The topic 
of social purpose and the wide range of moral question that corporations face require 
a more extensive reflection on political legitimacy.
If  decisions on corporate purpose are indeed partly political, we need to resolve 
how these questions are to be resolved legitimately. For instance, central banks derive 
their legitimacy from a mandate conferred on them by governments. Historically, such 
a mandate was required of all corporations, so that only those corporations whose 
 The social purpose of corporations 67
operations were deemed sufficiently socially valuable were permitted to operate within 
national borders. Recent theorists of the corporation have sought to revive such 
thinking (Anderson 2017, Ciepley 2013, Stout 2012).
Note that the communicative role of social and corporate purpose is not only 
 relevant for the relationship of corporations with society, but also within corpor-
ations. Leaders typically encounter challenges in connecting a given articulation of 
corporate purpose with the day-to-day operations of the firm. This challenge is a 
predictable outcome of involving only a small group of executives in the process of 
articulation. Our interviewees report that the first challenge they face is to communi-
cate corporate purpose internally. Enabling employees to pick out their corporate 
 purpose among several alternatives is a multi-year effort in large organisations. 
It is a further step to truly embed corporate purpose in corporate decision- making. 
Our interviewees report the most immediate impact of  corporate purpose on senior 
leader decision-making. Corporate purpose can serve as a yardstick enabling 
 members of  the organisation to challenge decisions, appealing to a  mutually 
 recognised standard. 
Stakeholder management, social responsiveness, and shared value approaches 
may all be useful in connecting corporate purpose with the day-to-day operations of 
the firm. All three approaches can be seen as heuristics to concretise high-level  purpose 
statements. For instance, the stakeholder approach may be used to work out the 
 implications of corporate purpose for employees, customers, shareholders, and other 
stakeholder groups. 
But a fixation on corporate purpose without factoring in the costs that the 
 corporation imposes on society can be problematic. In 2016, Andrew Bosworth, who 
is part of Facebook’s inner circle, wrote a memo addressing the downsides of 
Facebook’s corporate purpose. Bosworth says that ‘we believe in connecting people so 
deeply that anything that allows us to connect more people more often is de facto 
good. … That isn’t something we are doing for ourselves. Or for our stock price (ha!). 
It is literally just what we do. We connect people. Period’ (Buzzfeed 2016).
Bosworth appeals to purpose to justify the fact that Facebook can be used for 
online bullying and for planning terrorist attacks. Remarkably, he also claims that 
questionable corporate practices are justified in the light of Facebook’s purpose, 
including ‘[a]ll the questionable contact importing practices. All the subtle language 
that helps people stay searchable by friends. All of the work we do to bring more 
 communication in.’
Bosworth’s memo brings out that pursuing corporate purpose may have a dark 
side: namely, disregarding the costs corporations impose on society in pursuing 
their purpose. A decision-making framework based on corporate purpose should 
not only consider the value created for society. The framework should also consider 
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costs to society and point out ways of  balancing the benefits and costs. Such a 
framework also needs to include deontological constraints to avoid the possibility 
that corporations act fanatically by justifying bad actions by reference to an 
 overwhelming social purpose. 
4.4 The critical role of social and corporate purpose
The final role that social and corporate purpose play is in holding corporations to 
account for the benefits and harms they create for society. A precondition of exercis-
ing this critical function is that societal actors and corporations measure to what 
extent corporate activities are consistent with corporate and social purpose. 
Measures of social purpose can be differentiated into accounting measures and 
action-guiding measures. An example of an accounting measure in the financial 
domain is a profit-and-loss statement. A profit-and-loss statement captures to what 
extent a corporation has achieved its financial objectives in the past. An example of 
an action-guiding measure in the financial domain is return-on-investment. Return-
on-investment is used to compare potential projects ahead of time with a view to 
selecting the most financially rewarding opportunity.
Most current measures of corporate purpose are accounting measures. Our 
 interview partners reported using measures of environmental, social, and governance 
impact (ESG) and the ‘triple bottom line’. 
ESG measures consist of metrics to measure a corporation’s impact on the 
 environment, on social issues, and whether the corporation is well governed 
(Kocmanová & Šimberová 2014). For instance, a corporation may track its CO
2
 
 emissions to measure its impact on the environment. An example of a social metric is 
the proportion of women in leadership positions. 
ESG measures fit with the social responsiveness approach to articulating and  pursuing 
social purpose, as they focus on measuring major societal issues. The advantage of these 
ways of measuring social purpose is that results are comparable between companies, at 
least within the same industry. However, ESG measures typically do not directly address 
the question of to what extent a corporation achieves its corporate purpose. 
Of the three components, our interview partners feel most confident that they 
measure environmental impact accurately. In this area, there is wide consensus on the 
appropriate measures and on what good looks like, and regulators and other societal 
actors are relatively effective at holding corporations to account. Concerning the 
social and the governance components, our interview partners feel less confident that 
they have good measures in place. Their lack of confidence reflects the lack of consen-
sus on what good looks like, and what the role of corporations is in bringing these 
about. This is an area where more research would be beneficial for business leaders. 
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The ‘triple bottom line’ is the second widely used approach for measuring  corporate 
purpose (Henriques & Richardson 2013, Norman & MacDonald 2004). Similar to 
the ESG measures, the triple bottom line captures salient societal issues. In contrast to 
ESG measures, it includes the economic capital of the corporation alongside its 
 ecological and social capital. Taken together, these three ‘bottom lines’ provide a more 
holistic picture of the company’s performance than just the economic dimension. 
Both the ESG framework and the ‘triple bottom line’ may need to be extended in 
the light of technological change. Since the methodologies aim to capture salient 
social issues, they should be extended to include a ‘D’-component for data (Pasquale 
2015). This component would measure to what extent a corporation behaves 
 transparently and appropriately concerning the use of user data. 
None of the methodologies discussed measures corporate and social purpose fully 
satisfactorily. Solving the measurement challenge is perhaps the most important con-
dition for giving bite to corporate and social purpose. Only where convincing  measures 
are in place, as in the case of environmental measures, can regulators and societal 
actors be effective at holding corporations to account and enforcing change. 
5 CONCLUSION
We have argued that there is a broad convergence between different normative 
 perspectives on the view that corporations should serve a social purpose. Moreover, it 
is difficult to argue that corporations can forego pursuing a corporate purpose, as 
such a position needs to rely on strong assumptions concerning the social purpose of 
the corporation and market competition. We have also explored what roles the 
 concepts of social and corporate purpose can fulfil in moral reflection on and of cor-
porations. In particular, we have distinguished the constructive, the communicative, 
and the critical role of social and corporate purpose. Even if  there is, as we have 
demonstrated, much work to be done in developing the role of purpose in moral 
reflection on and in corporations, we have shown that the concept of purpose is 
 distinctly useful for such reflection. 
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